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#### “Engagement” requires direct talks with the target government

Crocker 9 – Chester Crocker, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, “Terms of Engagement”, New York Times, 9-13, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html?\_r=0

PRESIDENT OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey. Given the furor that will surround the news of America’s readiness to hold talks with Iran, he could start with “engagement” — one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon. The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its predecessor’s resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers. His critics show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making nice with nasty or hostile regimes. Let’s get a few things straight. Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk. Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them. Engagement is not normalization, and its goal is not improved relations. It is not akin to détente, working for rapprochement, or appeasement. So how do you define an engagement strategy? It does require direct talks. There is simply no better way to convey authoritative statements of position or to hear responses. But establishing talks is just a first step. The goal of engagement is to change the other country’s perception of its own interests and realistic options and, hence, to modify its policies and its behavior.

#### Violation --- plan’s only a unilateral change in policy; it doesn’t increase dialogue

#### Only our interpretation places a functional limit on the topic and provides neg link ground – they deny say no and backlash arguments.

#### T is a race to the top- prefer competing interpretations

### 1NC DA

#### Fast Track fight is on the top of the agenda-strong push from Obama is key-failure collapses global trade momentum

Good-Farm Policy-12/31/13

The FarmPolicy.com News Summary

HEADLINE: Farm Bill; Ag Economy; and, Biofuels- Tuesday

And with respect to trade, the Chicago Tribune editorial board[18] noted yesterday that, 'President Barack Obama wants the power to negotiate free-trade treaties on a fast track. With Trade Promotion Authority, he would have a good chance of clinching huge trade pacts now being hammered out with Europe and Asia. Yet Congress may not give him that authority — for all the wrong reasons.' The Tribune opinion item stated that, 'Within months the White House hopes to finish talks on a proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership with a group of Asia-Pacific nations. Talks with the European Union on the planned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership are progressing too. Those deals would eliminate barriers and promote economic activity between the U.S. and key allies. The upside is huge: Billions of dollars in new business would be generated if these pacts come to pass. 'Yet given the special interests that oppose free trade, neither deal stands much of a chance in Congress without TPA. Consider farm tariffs, one of the most frustrating roadblocks to any free-trade pact with Europe or Asia. The agriculture lobby here and abroad has long succeeded in imposing some of the least competitive public policies of any industry. Although farm protectionism hurts the vast majority of the world's citizens, standing up to clout-heavy constituencies such as U.S. sugar magnates requires extraordinary political courage. TPA is essential for overcoming the inevitable fight against vested interests that are determined to advance themselves at the expense of the nation's good. 'Federal lawmakers and the president have to make their case with much more gusto than we have seen so far. Congress could OK a Trade Promotion Authority bill in the first few months of 2014. But that won't happen without leadership on Capitol Hill and, especially, from the White House. Now's the time.'

#### Plan drains capital—hostage taking

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Free trade prevents multiple scenarios for world war and WMD Terrorism

Panzner 2008

Michael, faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase “Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,” pg. 136-138

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

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#### The United States federal government should remove its economic sanctions on the Republic of Cuba with the exception of status quo agriculture sanctions.

#### Cuban sustainable urban agriculture is a global model that’s spurring worldwide adoption

Ergas, Oregon sociology graduate student, 2013

(Christina, “Cuban Urban Agriculture as a Strategy for Food Sovereignty”, March, http://monthlyreview.org/2013/03/01/cuban-urban-agriculture-as-a-strategy-for-food-sovereignty

The agricultural revolution in Cuba has ignited the imaginations of people all over the world. Cuba’s model serves as a foundation for self-sufficiency, resistance to neocolonialist development projects, innovations in agroecology, alternatives to monoculture, and a more environmentally sustainable society. Instead of turning towards austerity measures and making concessions to large international powers during a severe economic downturn, Cubans reorganized food production and worked to gain food sovereignty as a means of subsistence, environmental protection, and national security.1 While these efforts may have been born of economic necessity, they are impressive as they have been developed in opposition to a corporate global food regime. In Sustainable Urban Agriculture in Cuba, Sinan Koont indicates that most of the global South has lost any semblance of food sovereignty—the ability to be self-sufficient, to practice a more sustainable form of agriculture, and to direct farming toward meeting the needs of people within a country, rather than producing cash crops for export (187). The World Bank and International Monetary Fund imposed structural adjustment programs and free trade agreements on the so-called third world. These policies increased the influence of multinational corporations, such as Monsanto and Cargill, in global food production. They also encouraged large-scale monocultures, whereby food production is specialized by region for international trade. These policies threatened the national food security of countries in several interrelated ways.2 First, economically vulnerable countries are subject to the vagaries of the international marketplace, fluctuating food prices, and heavily subsidized produce from the global North that undermine the ability of the former to compete. Second, in a for-profit economic system, certain crops, like sugarcane, potato, and corn, are planted to produce biofuels, primarily ethanol, instead of food for poor populations. Rich nations that can afford to buy crops for biofuels inflate market prices for food, and when droughts or floods destroy whole harvests, then scarce food still goes to the highest bidder. Third, nations that specialize in cash crops for export must import food, increasing overall insecurity and dependency on trade networks. These nations are more vulnerable to changes in the costs of petroleum, as it influences expenses associated with transportation, fertilizers, pesticides, and the overall price of food. In countries with higher per capita incomes, increasing food costs are an annoyance for many people but not necessarily life threatening. In countries with high rates of poverty, price increases can be devastating. All of the above problems converged during the 2007–2008 food crisis that resulted in riots in Egypt, Haiti, Indonesia, Mexico, and Bangladesh, just to name a few. People worldwide have been affected by these policies and have fought back. Some nations have taken to task corporations like Monsanto, as in the case of India’s response to genetically modified eggplant, which involved a boycott of Monsanto’s products and demands for the eradication of genetically modified foods.3 There are burgeoning local food movements, even in the United States, that despite numerous challenges attempt to produce food outside the current large-scale agricultural paradigm.4 There are also international movements that are working to change agricultural policies and practices. For example, La Vía Campesina is an international movement comprised of peasants, small-scale farmers, and their allies. Their primary goals are to stop neoliberal policies that promote oligopolistic corporate control over agriculture and to promote food sovereignty. In conjunction with these movements, Cuba has made remarkable strides toward establishing a system of food sovereignty. One of their most notable projects in this regard is their institutionalized and organized effort to expand agroecological practices, or a system of agriculture that is based on ecological principles and environmental concerns. Cuba has largely transformed food production in order to pursue a more sustainable path. These practices are not limited to the countryside. Cuba is the recognized leader of urban agriculture.5 As Koont highlights, the Cuban National Group for Urban Agriculture defines urban agriculture as the production of food within the urban and peri-urban perimeter, using intensive methods, paying attention to the human-crop-animal-environment interrelationships, and taking advantage of the urban infrastructure with its stable labor force. This results in diversified production of crops and animals throughout the year, based on sustainable practices which allow the recycling of waste materials (29). In 2007, urban agriculture comprised approximately 14.6 percent of agriculture in Cuba. Almost all of urban agriculture is organic. Cuba’s environmental protections and agricultural innovations have gained considerable recognition. The 2006 Sustainability Index Report, put together by the World Wildlife Fund by combining the United Nations Human Development Index and Ecological Footprint measures (or natural resource use per capita), contends that the only nation in the world that is living sustainably is Cuba.6 The island nation is particularly lauded for its strides in urban food production.7 Sustainable Urban Agriculture in Cuba is the first book to take a comprehensive look at this practice around the entire island. Koont indicates that the significance of urban agriculture in Cuba is that although Cuba is not completely food self-sufficient, it is the only example the world has of a country that produces most of its food locally, employing agroecological techniques for production. Furthermore, most of the food produced is for local consumption. As a result, Cuba has one of the shortest producer-to-consumer chains in the world. In this book, Koont documents the impressive transformations that have taken place within this nation. While Cuba imports the majority of its calories and protein, urban agriculture has increased food security and sovereignty in the area of vegetable production. In 2005, Cuba was “importing 60 percent to 70 percent of what it consumes [mostly so-called bulk foods] at an estimated cost of $1.5 billion to $2 billion annually.”8 However, urban agriculture within and around Havana accounts for 60–90 percent of the produce consumed in the city and utilizes about 87,000 acres of land.9 Cubans employ various forms of urban agriculture, including gardens, reforestation projects, and small-scale livestock operations. In 2010, 75 percent of the Cuban population lived in cities—a city is defined as such if the population is in excess of 1,000 persons.10 Thus, urban food production is the most practical and efficient means to supply the population with food. These transformations did not suddenly materialize. Koont provides a useful overview of the historical circumstances that contributed to changes in food production in Cuba. After the 1959 revolution and the subsequent imposition of the U.S. embargo, Cuba became reliant on the Soviet Union. Cubans used large-scale, industrial, monoculture to produce sugar, which was exchanged for Soviet petroleum and currency. The economy was largely tied to high-yield sugar production. In a vicious cycle, this type of agriculture required importing agrochemical fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, and oil to run heavy machinery. In 1989, three times more arable land in Cuba was utilized to produce sugar for export than food for national consumption. Most of the Cuban diet came from imported food.11 When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, Cubans and their economy suffered greatly. Cubans no longer had access to the inputs required to maintain large-scale agriculture, given how dependent such agriculture is on oil. To make matters worse, the end of trade between the Soviet Bloc and Cuba resulted in a loss of access to food, which reduced Cubans’ protein intake by 30 percent.12 The system of agriculture that was in place was not sustainable or organized for self-sufficiency. Cubans refer to the ensuing period of resource scarcity as the Special Period in Peace Time. This period included shortages of food, fuel, and medicine. Faced with food scarcity and malnutrition, Cubans had to revamp their food production systems, which included collectively producing a variety of crops in the most efficient manner possible. Additionally, the necessary mission of Cuban politicians, ecologists, farmers, scientists, biologists, and farm workers was to mend the ecological cycles of interdependence that large-scale, exploitative agriculture destroyed.13 In spite of these hardships, Cuban society was equipped to contend with the ensuing crisis, given the country’s specific commitments and agroecological projects that were already in operation. The Cuban government and leadership worked to provide institutional support to re-direct food production and to enable the development of an extensive urban agricultural project. Governmental policies, following the 1959 revolution, that prioritized extending education, science, and technology served as a springboard for these new agricultural projects. First, the revolutionary government established organizations to address social problems and concerns. These organizations served as supply and distribution networks for food and centers for research that examined farmers’ traditional knowledge, continuing education programs that taught agroecological practices, distribution of technological innovations, and evaluation of existing programs and operations. Second, the government prioritized human resources and capabilities. Thus, the Cuban government invested in human capital by making education more widely available and accessible at all levels. Making use of the organizational infrastructure and investing in the Cuban people made the agroecological transition possible during the economic crisis in the early 1990s. Koont examines how the early agroecological projects, prior to the Special Period, served as a basis for future development and expansion of the revolutionary transformation of agriculture in Cuba. Science is publicly owned and directed toward furthering human development, rather than capital accumulation. Cuba had the human resources to address food scarcity, given that they had 11 percent of the scientists in Latin America. Scientists were already experimenting with agroecology, in order to take advantage of ecological synergisms, utilizing biodiversity and biological pest control. These efforts were focused on diminishing the need for inputs such as artificial fertilizers and pesticides. Other projects included integrating animals into rotational grazing systems with crops and diversifying with polycultures. Cubans also began recycling sugarcane waste as cattle feed; the cows, in turn, excrete waste that is applied to soil as fertilizer, thereby restoring ecological interdependence. By combining manure with worm castings, Cubans were able to fertilize most of their crops organically without having to import fertilizer from long distances. Their experimentation also included creating urban organopónicos, which were constructed four years before the Soviet collapse. Organopónicos are raised beds of organic materials confined in rectangular walls where plants are grown in areas with poor soil quality. Additionally, personal household plots had long existed within urban areas.14 Altogether these experiments and projects served as the foundation to pursue greater self-sufficiency, a system of urban agriculture, and a more sustainable form of food production. The pursuit of food sovereignty has yielded many benefits. Urban agriculture has increased food production, employment, environmental recovery and protection, and community building. Perhaps the most impressive strides are in the area of food security. In the early 1990s, during the Special Period, Cubans’ caloric intake decreased to approximately 1,863 calories a day. In the midst of food scarcity, Cuba ramped up food production. Between 1994 and 2006, Cubans increased urban output by a thousand fold, with an annual growth rate of 78 percent a year. In 2001, Cubans cultivated 18,591 hectares of urban land; in 2006, 52,389 hectares were cultivated. As a result of these efforts, the caloric intake for the population averaged 3,356 calories a day in 2005. During the economic crisis, unemployment sharply increased. However, the creation of extensive urban agricultural programs, which included centers of information and education, provided new jobs that subsumed 7 percent of the workforce and provided good wages. Urban agriculture and reforestation projects also constituted important gains for the environment. Shifting food production away from reliance on fossil fuels and petrochemicals is better for human health and reduces the carbon dioxide emissions associated with food production. Urban reforestation projects provide sinks for air pollution and help beautify cities. Finally, local production of food decreases food miles. It also requires both local producers and consumers. Therefore, community members get to know each other and are responsible for each other through the production and consumption of food. Sustainable Urban Agriculture in Cuba is a detailed documentation of the agroecological transformation in Cuba. Koont delivers a significant amount of information regarding the mechanics of urban agriculture. He highlights the enabling factors of urban agriculture in Cuba, which are the government’s creation of the organizational infrastructure and their investment in human capital. He also provides an assessment of the results from urban agriculture. The results he discusses are gains made in food production, increased employment, environmental recovery and protection, and community building. However, the majority of the book reads like a dry technical manual or guide to urban agriculture, something akin to official Cuban government documents. There are many bulleted lists throughout each chapter that outline types of crops grown, strategies, key features of urban agriculture in Cuba, collaborating organizations, evaluation criteria, tons of produce in each province, program objectives, and the lists go on. While the book contains a significant amount of information regarding process, extent, technology, education, and evaluation surrounding urban agriculture in Cuba, it does little in the way of setting up a theoretical framework and thoroughly exploring the significance of Cuba’s model of urban agriculture for the world. The introduction and the final chapter of the book are the two chapters that touch on Cuba’s relevance and implications. In addition, Koont offers minimal critical analysis of the challenges that Cubans still face in their quest for food sovereignty. Despite these shortcomings, Koont provides a much-needed detailed account of the strides made in Cuban urban agriculture. Cuba’s example has clear implications for food sovereignty and security for the rest of the world. With the very real threat of climate change, potential energy crises, market fluctuations, worldwide droughts, or other economic and environmental problems that may force nations to relocalize food production, this example can serve as a template for future food sovereignty. We can continue to learn from Cuba as they generate new technologies and innovations in organic urban agriculture into the future. In addition, the Cuban example serves as a testament to the potential for a society’s resilience and is worth investigating not just for their innovations, but for inspiration.

#### Lifting sanctions means agribusiness has a free hand to destroy Cuba’s sustainable ag model

Gonzalez, Seattle law professor, 2004

(Carmen, “Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects For Economic & Social Development Part Ii Of Ii: Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the Environment: The Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development”, Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 419, lexis)

The greatest challenge to Cuba's unique agricultural experiment is the eventual renewal of trade relations The greatest challenge to Cuba's unique agricultural experiment is the eventual renewal of trade relations with the United States and the re-integration of Cuba into the global trading system. At the behest of the United States, Cuba was excluded from major trade and financial institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank, and regional trade organizations. n357 Paradoxically, while Cuba's economic isolation produced enormous hardship, it also gave Cuba free rein to respond to the crisis of the Special Period in ways that diverged radically from the prevailing neoliberal model. One of the most significant decisions that Cuba will face after the lifting of the U.S. economic embargo is whether to join the World Bank, the [\*483] IMF, and the Inter-American Development Bank. n358 With an external debt of approximately $ 12 billion as well as an additional $ 15 billion to $ 20 billion debt to Russia, n359 Cuba might be tempted to avail itself of concessional loans and debt restructuring assistance from the IMF and the World Bank in order to normalize relations with external creditors and to obtain badly needed infusions of capital. Debt relief, however, will come at a very high price. Cuba, like other developing countries, will be compelled to implement neoliberal reforms pursuant to structural adjustment programs overseen by the World Bank and the IMF. These programs will require Cuba to maximize the revenues available for debt service by slashing social spending and vigorously promoting exports. In light of Cuba's "comparative advantage" in agricultural production, it is likely that structural adjustment will result in renewed emphasis on sugar production or on the cultivation of non-traditional agricultural exports (such as flowers, fruits, and vegetables). Cuba will be required to prioritize agricultural exports over domestic food production, to drastically reduce subsidies and social safety nets (including agricultural subsidies and food aid), to privatize state lands and government-owned enterprises, and to open its markets to foreign competition. These reforms would be enacted in conjunction with pre-existing commitments under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture to eliminate non-tariff barriers and reduce tariffs, to phase out domestic subsidies, and to eliminate export subsidies. Cuba would also be obligated under the SPS Agreement to permit the cultivation of genetically modified crops unless Cuba could present strict scientific proof that such cultivation will harm human health or the environment. Since such proof is unlikely given scientific uncertainty regarding the effects of genetically modified organisms, it is likely that Cuba, like Argentina, would become a major cultivator of genetically modified crops. Based on the track record of the neoliberal model in the developing world, it appears that Cuba's adoption of the standard package of neoliberal reforms would jeopardize food security at the national level. First, the neoliberal reforms would undercut domestic food production by diverting prime agricultural land to export production and by requiring Cuba to open its markets to cheap, subsidized food from the United States. This would reduce Cuba's food self-sufficiency and would reinstate Cuba's dangerous dependence on food imports to satisfy basic nutritional needs. Second, renewed emphasis on agricultural exports to generate foreign exchange would make Cuba's trade-based entitlements highly vulnerable to fluctuations in world market agricultural prices and to the declining terms of [\*484] trade for agricultural products. In the terminology of entitlements, Cuba's production-based entitlements would be eroded in favor of highly precarious trade-based entitlements. n360 In addition, a significant percentage of Cuba's export earnings would be earmarked for debt service and thus unavailable for investment or for the importation of food and other vital items. Finally, the cultivation of genetically modified crops would reinstate Cuba's trade dependence on the United States (and subordinate Cuba's food security to U.S. political and economic interests) by shutting Cuba out of lucrative EU markets. The neoliberal model would also jeopardize food security at the household level by fueling rural poverty and inequality. The promotion of export production is likely to provoke a land grab by elite Cubans and transnational corporations at the expense of Cuban smallholders. Export production tends to favor wealthy farmers with ready access to capital who can benefit from economies of scale in both production and marketing and can withstand the dramatic price fluctuations that plague many export commodities. n361 Furthermore, the opening of Cuba's markets to cheap food imports from the United States, in conjunction with the slashing of agricultural subsidies and social safety nets, will threaten the livelihoods of the majority of Cuban farmers and produce economic polarization in rural areas. Finally, the cultivation of genetically modified crops is likely to accelerate the dispossession of small farmers by disrupting the traditional practice of saving, sharing, and breeding seeds. As farmers become increasingly dependent on seeds and other inputs produced by transnational corporations, they may suffer severe economic dislocation if input prices increase or if farm revenues drop. Dispossessed farmers are likely to migrate en masse to towns and cities, thereby straining limited urban amenities. In the terminology of [\*485] entitlements, Cuban smallholders are likely to be deprived of production-based entitlements (land with which to grow food), trade-based entitlements (the ability to buy food on the market with the income generated by agricultural production), labor-based entitlements (due to the loss of jobs to mechanization on the large farms), and transfer-based entitlements (state subsidies and food aid). Neoliberal economic reforms may also jeopardize Cuba's experiment in sustainable agriculture. Export production tends to reinforce ecologically unsustainable monocultures that require extensive application of agrochemicals. These monocultures displace traditional food crops that contribute to soil fertility, pest control, and fodder production. The cultivation of genetically modified crops may exacerbate the problems associated with industrial agriculture by reinforcing monocultural production, eroding biodiversity, and increasing the use of herbicides and insecticides (by accelerating resistance to these products). Even if Cuba is able to capture an export niche in the lucrative market for certified organic products, the introduction of genetically modified organisms may undermine Cuba's efforts by producing genetic contamination. Moreover, the cultivation of Bt crops may injure organic farmers by accelerating resistance to one of the most widely used natural pesticides. Finally, if the cultivation of genetically modified crops results in increased use of herbicides and insecticides, this may harm organic agriculture by killing non-target organisms (including the natural enemies of the target pest and other beneficial insects) and by producing ecosystem-wide disturbances. In short, Cuba's adoption of neoliberal economic reforms threatens to recreate colonial and post-colonial patterns of land tenure and production, whereby the ruling elite and transnational corporations grow export crops on large industrial farms while small-scale producers are relegated to marginal subsistence plots or forced to abandon agriculture altogether. Furthermore, the cultivation of genetically modified crops may re-introduce trade dependency on the United States by foreclosing access to the lucrative European market. The prospects for food security and ecological sustainability under neoliberalism are grim. D. Summary and Conclusion: The Symbolic Significance of Cuba The saga of Cuban agriculture illustrates the ways in which developing countries are structurally disadvantaged in the global trading system by the colonial and post-colonial division of labor that relegates them to the production of primary agricultural commodities. Cuba's integration into the world economy as an exporter of sugar and an importer of manufactured goods and food products so deeply constrained its development options that not even a socialist revolution could alter these pre-existing trade and production patterns. It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the tightening of the U.S. economic embargo that Cuba was forced by external circumstances to diversify its exports, diversify its trading partners, [\*486] decentralize agricultural production, prioritize domestic food production, and promote organic and semi-organic farming techniques. Cuba is **symbolically important** because it demonstrates that there is an alternative to the dominant export-oriented industrial agricultural model and that this alternative can boost agricultural productivity, enhance food security, and protect the environment. n362 However, the transformation of Cuban agriculture was a response to the crisis of the Special Period and was made possible by Cuba's relative economic isolation. Once the U.S. embargo is lifted and Cuba is reintegrated into the global trading system, Cuba, like every other developing country, will face intense pressure to restructure its economy along neoliberal lines. The results could be devastating. It is therefore important to recognize the neoliberal threat, to consider whether neoliberalism can ever be made compatible with food security and ecological sustainability, and to explore alternative strategies for sustainable rural development.

#### Sustainable agriculture prevents extinction

Peters 10 (Kathryn A. Peters, J.D. from the University of Oregon . "Creating a Sustainable Urban Agriculture Revolution". University of Oregon Law School. law.uoregon.edu/org/jell/docs/251/peters.pdf)

An adequate food supply is essential for the survival of the human ¶ race. Historically, the U.S. food system has been one of abundance. ¶ However, degradation of the environment, climate change, ¶ dependence on foreign oil and food imports, urban development ¶ trends, and increased demand due to population growth and the ¶ emerging biofuel industry2¶ all threaten our food supply. In response¶ to these threats, local-food and sustainable agriculture movements ¶ have recently formed to raise awareness of the need to pursue ¶ alternatives to the current system.3¶ In 2009, the White House ¶ acknowledged the importance of changing the way we grow food by ¶ planting an organic garden on its grounds.4¶ In the wake of the ¶ economic crisis of 2008, victory gardens, which were first made ¶ popular during the World War II era, have reemerged and created ¶ additional awareness of the need to pursue food production ¶ alternatives.5¶ Victory gardens and local sustainable agriculture reduce ¶ dependency on the established food production system, but, because ¶ the U.S. population is clustered in densely populated metropolitan ¶ areas,6¶ the majority of the population currently lacks access to land on ¶ which to grow food. ¶ In the face of environmental, economic, and social equity ¶ challenges, it is imperative that the government, at federal, state, and ¶ local levels, establish policies that promote sustainable urban ¶ agriculture to ensure access to an adequate food supply produced with ¶ minimal impact on the environment. Environmental threats stemming ¶ from climate change and the depletion and degradation of natural ¶ resources will increasingly impact the planet’s food production¶ system.7¶ The current economic crisis has increased the burden on the ¶ government to provide relief in the forms of unemployment ¶ compensation8¶ and supplemental nutrition assistance.9¶ An inherent ¶ consequence of the economic crisis is a widening disparity between ¶ the rich and poor and increased social inequity between the ¶ socioeconomic classes in America. Establishing a sustainable urban ¶ agricultural system would reduce the environmental degradation that ¶ is caused by modern agricultural practices, reduce the financial strain ¶ on government resources by increasing urban productivity and ¶ enabling urbanites to grow a local food supply, and reduce ¶ socioeconomic disparities by providing less-advantaged populations ¶ in urban areas with access to an adequate supply of fresh, nutritious ¶ food.

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#### Aff’s “freedom of speech” discourse excludes persons with disabilities.

Nussbaum, 2006 (Martha C., Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics in the Divinity School, also in the Law School, the Department of Philosophy, and the College; Associate Faculty in the Departments of Classics and Political Science, Member of the Committee on Southern Asian Studies, Board Member of the Human Rights Program, Coordinator of the Center for Comparative Constitutionalism, M.A., Ph.D, “Frontiers of Justice Disability, Nationalist, Species Membership”, gigapedia)

1. Impairment and disability. Despite the tradition’s major contributions and ongoing value, its modern exemplars prove insufficient to address three of the most pressing problems of justice in today’s world. The classical theorists all assumed that their contracting agents were men who were roughly equal in capacity, and capable of productive economic activity. They thus omitted from the bargaining situation women (understood as non-“productive”), children, and elderly people—although the parties might represent their interests.11 These omissions, already striking in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, have to some extent been rectified in contemporary contract doctrines, though the idea that the family is a private sphere immune from law and contract has not always received the thoroughgoing criticism it deserves.12 No social contract doctrine, however, includes people with severe and atypical physical and mental impairments in the group of those by whom basic political principles are chosen. Of course in most modern societies, until recently, such people were simply not included in society. They were excluded and stigmatized; there was no political movement to include them. People with severe mental impairments, in particular, were not even educated. They were hidden away in institutions or left to die from neglec**t**;13 they were never considered part of the public realm.14 So it was not surprising that the classical social contract thinkers failed to imagine them as participants in the choice of political principles, nor, indeed, that they were willing to sign on to foundational assumptions (for example, a rough equality of power and physical and mental ability) that ensured that they would not be included at the initial, foundational stage. For many people with impairments and disabilities, who are fully capable of participating in political choice, this omission from the situation of basic choice already seems to be a defect from the point of view of justice. They are not being treated as full equals of other citizens; their voices are not being heard when basic principles are chosen. This problem seems all the graver when we recognize that many of the factors that sometimes exclude people with impairments from participation in political choice are social and far from inevitable. Thus there is no principled reason why they could not have been included in a choice situation that is not supposed to assume any particular design of social institutions. Some people with severe mental impairments, however, could not be included in the group of political choosers directly, however generously we assess their potential for such a contribution. For those people, the failure to include them in the role of chooser does not seem like an injustice, so long as there is some other way to take their interests into account. The omission of people with impairments and disabilities from the contract situation becomes more damaging still, how-ever, once we take account of a striking structural feature of all social contract theories. The social contract tradition conflates two questions that are in principle distinct: “By whom are society’s basic principles designed?” and “For whom are society’s basic principles designed?”15 The contracting parties are imagined to be one and the same as the citizens who will live together and whose lives will be regulated by the principles that are chosen. The core moral idea in the tradition is that of mutual advantage and reciprocity among people who need to make such a contract. The chosen principles regulate, in the first instance, their dealings with one another. Other interests and persons (or other creatures) may be included either derivatively, through the parties’ own cares and commitments, or at a later stage, after the principles are already chosen. But the primary subjects of justice are the same ones who choose the principles. Thus when the tradition specifies certain abilities (rationality, language, roughly equal physical and mental capacity) as prerequisites for participation in the procedure that chooses principles, these requirements also have large consequences for the treatment of people with impairments and disabilities as recipients or subjects of justice in the resulting society. The fact that they are not included in the group of choosers means that they are not included (except derivatively or at a later stage) in the group of those for whom principles are chosen. Rawls’s theory is more subtle at this point, because he does explicitly distinguish the parties in the Original Position from citizens in the society that they will ultimately design. (Citizens lack the informational limitations of the Veil of Ignorance; in their place they have an extensive moral education designed to engender sentiments that render the society stable.) But so far as our questions about disability and species membership are concerned, this difference is not significant. The parties choose principles as if for a society in which they themselves are going to live, advancing their plans. The citizens live with the principles those parties have chosen, under that thought experiment. Thus, though they may make practical arrangements for the needs of human and animal beings who were not included in the original contracting group, they are not at liberty to redesign the principles of justice themselves in the light of their awareness of these issues. In Political Liberalism, Rawls puts things in a slightly different way that makes his basic attachment to the historical tradition clear: the parties in the Original Position are now envisaged as “representatives” of or trustees for citizens. The characterization of the citizens for whom they are trustees, however, now explicitly incorporates just those features of TJ’s characterization of the parties that causes problems from the point of view of disability issues: their mental and physical abilities, like those of TJ’s parties, are said to lie all within the “normal” range. So, in the end, the parties are designing principles for citizens who, like themselves, are human beings possessed of no serious mental or physical impairments. But the “by whom” and the “for whom” questions need not be linked in this way. One might have a theory that held that many living beings, human and even nonhuman, are primary subjects of justice, even though they are not capable of participating in the procedure through which political principles are chosen. One might have strong reasons for seeking such a theory and separating the two questions, if one starts from the idea that many different types of lives have dignity and are worthy of respect. If one thinks that way, one would acknowledge from the start that the capacity to make a contract, and the possession of those abilities that make for mutual advantage in the resulting society, are not necessary conditions for being a citizen who has dignity and deserves to be treated with respect on a basis of equality with others. Thus the omission of people with disabilities from the initial choice of basic political principles has large consequences for their equal citizenship more generally, through the structure that is characteristic of social contract theories. Today, when the issue of justice for people with disabilities is prominent on the agenda of every decent society, the omission of all of them from participation in the situation of basic political choice looks problematic, given the evident capacity of many if not most of them for choice; and their omission from the group of persons for whom society’s most basic principles are chosen is more problematic still. Even if their interests can be taken into account derivatively or at a later stage, we naturally wonder why this postponement is necessary, and whether it is not likely to affect the fully equal treatment of such citizens—even if it is not in and of itself a form of unequal treatment. Rawls, as we shall see, acknowledges a gap in his theory at this point and worries about it. I shall argue that Rawls’s treatment of the problem of disability is inadequate, and yet not easy to rectify. The full inclusion of citizens with mental and physical impairments raises questions that go to the heart of the classical contractarian account of justice and social cooperation.

#### Reject the Aff – Society’s treatment of disability is a reflection of its tolerance for all hostile acts towards “otherness” – leads to eugenics and turns the case.

Bagenstos, 2K (Samuel R., Law Professor at Harvard, 86 Va. L. Rev. 397, April)

Erving Goffman's notion of stigma is a useful tool here. Although "stigma" refers colloquially to animus and prejudice, Goffman used the term to refer to a broader problem. He described the condition as an "undesired differentness" from what society deems to be "normal" or expected. [153](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n153#n153" \t "_self) Under Goffman's approach, the core aspect of stigma occurs when prevailing social practices treat particular "undesirable" traits as universally discrediting. As Goffman emphasized, those who deal with stigmatized persons "tend to impute a wide range of imperfections on the basis of the original one." [154](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n154#n154" \t "_self) As a result, people with stigmatized traits are not considered to be among the "normals" for whom society, and its institutions, are designed. [155](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n155#n155" \t "_self) This stigma is as much about social attitudes as about the traits themselves; even if an individual can "cure" a stigmatized trait, she may still not be accepted in the community of "normals." [156](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n156#n156" \t "_self) Goffman's construct of "stigma" provides a useful tool in giving content to my subordination-based understanding of disability rights law for at least two reasons. First, Goffman's analysis strongly influenced the thoughts of many of the disability rights activists on whose work I rely. [157](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n157#n157" \t "_self) Second, that analysis provides a way of connecting the animus-and stereotype-based discrimination experienced by many people with disabilities with their more systemic neglect in the design of the environment. It therefore provides a way of treating the three basic manifestations of disability discrimination under a single rubric, and it provides a way of predicting which types of impairments are likely to be associated with systematic deprivation of opportunities. Because Goffman wrote primarily about individual interactions between "the normals" and "the stigmatized," his notion of stigma most directly helps to describe the prejudice and stereotypes people with disabilities experience in such interactions. [158](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n158#n158" \t "_self) It is especially useful in explaining the "spread effect," under which an impairment to a particular life function is seen as universally disabling. [159](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n159#n159" \t "_self) But Goffman's analysis of stigma helps to describe the society-wide neglect of people with disabilities as well. [160](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n160#n160" \t "_self) In particular, it helps to explain why [\*439] people with some impairments are likely to be systematically neglected by social decisions, and why those people are likely to be the same people as those who experience animus and stereotyping. [161](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n161#n161" \t "_self) If stigma means that an individual is not considered to be one of "the normals," then people with stigmatized impairments are likely not to be a part of the social "norm" considered by those who design the social and physical environment. Even if the environment's "designers" do not harbor prejudiced or stereotyped thoughts about people with stigmatized conditions, they are likely not to consider their needs in the same way that they consider the needs of those who are "normal." Disability rights advocates have long made this precise point about "disability." [162](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n162#n162" \t "_self) They have argued that "the entire physical and social organization of life" is frequently structured as though everyone were physically strong, as though all bodies were shaped [\*440] the same, as though everyone could walk, hear, and see well, as though everyone could work and play at a pace that is not compatible with any kind of illness or pain, as though no one were ever dizzy or incontinent or simply needed to sit or lie down. [163](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n163#n163" \t "_self) This phenomenon is most obvious in the built environment. Architects design structures with a model of the "normal" user in mind, and that model has typically been a person without any discernible impairments. [164](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n164#n164" \t "_self) This "assumption of able-bodiedness as the norm" [165](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n165#n165" \t "_self) can be seen in buildings with unnecessary stairs, doorways that are too narrow to accommodate wheelchairs, and entrances that fail to provide any detectable warning for people with visual impairments. But the phenomenon of neglect extends beyond the decisions that have constructed our physical architecture. It affects our patterns of social organization as well. Among other things, it affects the structure of jobs and the means by which businesses and governments deliver services. [166](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n166#n166" \t "_self) Why have those who constructed our social and physical environment failed to consider people with disabilities as among the "normal" users? One explanation might look to the very history of [\*441] prejudice and stereotypes noted by Congress. For much of our history, people with a variety of physical and mental disabilities were "shunted aside, hidden, and ignored." [167](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n167#n167" \t "_self) People with impairments ranging from epilepsy to blindness to mental retardation were segregated from the community in a collection of congregate institutions. [168](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n168#n168" \t "_self) Such segregation "perpetuated unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life." [169](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n169#n169" \t "_self) Even among those who were not institutionalized, people with disabilities frequently did not work, patronize businesses, or use government services outside of the home. [170](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n170#n170" \t "_self) (In some cases, they were required by law to stay at home; as late as 1974, some major American jurisdictions still maintained "ugly laws" that prohibited "unsightly" people - a category that encompassed people with disabilities - from appearing in public. [171](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n171#n171" \t "_self) ) A person designing a particular building, production process, or job description could thus be forgiven for failing to think of people with disabilities as potential customers or workers. The designer might have had no particular negative attitudes toward "the disabled." Indeed, it might never have entered her mind that people with disabilities might wish to use her building or work in her business; she might simply have had no available model of people with disabilities as ordinary people with ordinary needs and tastes. [172](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n172#n172" \t "_self) Al [\*442] though people with disabilities have become more and more integrated into society at large in the last two decades, the history of exclusion may have a particularly long "tail." Buildings and processes designed without people with disabilities in mind may be used for many years to come. And prejudice and stereotypes - which have themselves been fed by the absence of people with disabilities from the larger community [173](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n173#n173" \t "_self) - may linger even longer. [174](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n174#n174" \t "_self) The historic exclusion of people with disabilities from "normal" society has interacted in complex and reciprocal ways with broader ideological currents. Lennard Davis has argued that the notion of "norms" dates only to the development of a science of statistics in the early nineteenth century. [175](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n175#n175" \t "_self) Until then, Davis contends, the place now occupied by the "norm" was held by the notion of an "ideal," which was understood to be unattainable by any human. [176](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n176#n176" \t "_self) But the [\*443] newfound "concept of a norm, unlike that of an ideal, implied that the majority of the population must or should somehow be part of the norm." [177](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n177#n177" \t "_self) Early statisticians made this point expressly: They argued that social institutions should be built around the broad middle group of persons who fit the social norm. [178](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n178#n178" \t "_self) As Davis demonstrates, their arguments both provided justification for, and drew strength from, an ideology that accorded a morally privileged position to the middle class. [179](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n179#n179" \t "_self) More darkly, **they fed the eugenic ideology that led to the institutionalization and sterilization of many people whom we now label "disabled**." [180](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n180#n180" \t "_self) The nineteenth-century notion that institutions should be designed for the "norm" persists. But our vision of "normal" human attributes has become increasingly idealized, as the eugenics movement (which sought "to norm the nonstandard" [181](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n181#n181" \t "_self) ) may have been the first to demonstrate. Rob Imrie's account of modernist architecture points out the effect that such an ideology of the "norm" has had on our built environment. In seeking to make form follow function, and to "tie buildings back to the scale of the human being," modernists harbored a particularly able-bodied vision of who "the human being" was. [182](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n182#n182" \t "_self) Imrie illustrates this vision by pointing to Le Corbusier's "Modular," which "utilized the proportions of the (able) body to enable the architect to create the built spaces." [183](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n183#n183" \t "_self) The "Modular," a diagram of a muscular six-foot tall man, was "the person for whom functionality in building design and form was being defined." [184](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n184#n184" \t "_self) Many inaccessible features of today's buildings, Imrie argues, trace directly to modernism's exclusion of people with disabilities from its idealized version of the "norm." [185](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n185#n185" \t "_self) [\*444] As we move to a new millennium, we seem to believe as strongly as ever that everyone should fit an "ideal" body type. Although there are surely a variety of reasons for this development, the most notable are a consumer/advertising culture that idealizes beauty and a widespread belief in the ability of modern medicine to enhance our mental and physical lives. [186](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n186#n186" \t "_self) As a result, the ideological currents that exclude people with disabilities from our notion of the "norm" stubbornly remain with us. In this view, "disability" is a group status, but it is not one defined by anything inherent in the members of the group. Rather, the attitudes and practices that exclude people with "disabilities" from many opportunities to participate in society are the very ones that create the "disability" category. Although individuals em [\*445] braced by the category have vastly different impairments and limitations (indeed, some have no impairment or limitation at all), what is crucial is that society treats them as essentially similar. [188](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n188#n188" \t "_self) In Wendell's words, "widespread perceptions that people with disabilities are similar in very significant ways create the category, "people with disabilities.'" [189](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=76459013af57cf46b6d59eec148f7142&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=deac550f5aac503ff467eaa85488b002" \l "n189#n189" \t "_self) The **widespread** **acts of "discrimination, segregation, and denial of equal opportunity**" directed at people with disabilities have effectively **marked that group as a "dependent caste."**

### Violence

#### No internal link—freedom of expression is inevitable

#### Their expansion of structural violence to an all-pervasive omnipresence makes preventing war impossible

Ken Boulding 78 is professor of economics and director, Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, “Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 342-354

Galtung is very legitimately interested in problems of world poverty and the failure of development of the really poor. He tried to amalga- mate this interest with the peace research interest in the more narrow sense. Unfortunately, he did this by downgrading the study of inter- national peace, labeling it "negative peace" (it should really have been labeled "negative war") and then developing the concept of "structural violence," which initially meant all those social structures and histories which produced an expectation of life less than that of the richest and longest-lived societies. He argued by analogy that if people died before the age, say, of 70 from avoidable causes, that this was a death in "war"' which could only be remedied by something called "positive peace." Unfortunately, the concept of structural violence was broadened, in the word of one slightly unfriendly critic, to include anything that Galtung did not like. Another factor in this situation was the feeling, certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that nuclear deterrence was actually succeeding as deterrence and that the problem of nuclear war had receded into the background. This it seems to me is a most danger- ous illusion and diverted conflict and peace research for ten years or more away from problems of disarmament and stable peace toward a grand, vague study of world developments, for which most of the peace researchers are not particularly well qualified. To my mind, at least, the quality of the research has suffered severely as a result.' The complex nature of the split within the peace research community is reflected in two international peace research organizations. The official one, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), tends to be dominated by Europeans somewhat to the political left, is rather, hostile to the United States and to the multinational cor- porations, sympathetic to the New International Economic Order and thinks of itself as being interested in justice rather than in peace. The Peace Science Society (International), which used to be called the Peace Research Society (International), is mainly the creation of Walter Isard of the University of Pennsylvania. It conducts meetings all around the world and represents a more peace-oriented, quantitative, science- based enterprise, without much interest in ideology. COPRED, while officially the North American representative of IPRA, has very little active connection with it and contains within itself the same ideological split which, divides the peace research community in general. It has, however, been able to hold together and at least promote a certain amount of interaction between the two points of view. Again representing the "scientific" rather than the "ideological" point of view, we have SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, very generously (by the usual peace research stand- ards) financed by the Swedish government, which has performed an enormously useful service in the collection and publishing of data on such things as the war industry, technological developments, arma- ments, and the arms trade. The Institute is very largely the creation of Alva Myrdal. In spite of the remarkable work which it has done, how- ever, her last book on disarmament (1976) is almost a cry of despair over the folly and hypocrisy of international policies, the overwhelming power of the military, and the inability of mere information, however good, go change the course of events as we head toward ultimate ca- tastrophe. I do not wholly share her pessimism, but it is hard not to be a little disappointed with the results of this first generation of the peace research movement. Myrdal called attention very dramatically to the appalling danger in which Europe stands, as the major battleground between Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union if war ever should break out. It may perhaps be a subconscious recognition-and psychological denial-of the sword of Damocles hanging over Europe that has made the European peace research movement retreat from the realities of the international system into what I must unkindly describe as fantasies of justice. But the American peace research community, likewise, has retreated into a somewhat niggling scientism, with sophisticated meth- odologies and not very many new ideas. I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce some- thing like the Keynesian revolution in economics, which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others), coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which rein- forced this new theoretical framework. As a result, we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy, and even though this conventional wisdom is not wholly wise, there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression, simply because of everybody's ignorance, and the moder- ately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-974, which, compared with the period 1929 to 1932, was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. In the international system, however, there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. There has been some improvement. Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. We have had the beginnings of detente, and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races, wars, and revolutions which we cannot really afford. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temper- ate zone is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff. The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It has not been able to prevent an arms race, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that war, the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace," remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, a danger to human survival far greater than poverty, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconven- ience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twenti- eth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not acounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, ad- vancing technology is creating a situation where in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore if any- thing goes wrong everything goes wrong. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of iso- lated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems. The one-world system, therefore, which science, transportation, and communication are rapidly giving us, is inherently more precarious than the many-world system of the past. It is all the more important, therefore, to make it internally robust and capable only of recoverable catastrophes. The necessity for stable peace, therefore, increases with every improvement in technology, either of war or of peacex

#### The Rhetoric of Responsibility to “protect” radicalizes victims of genocide but doesn’t increase protection – it leaves them more vulnerable

Belloni ‘7 [Roberto Belloni, Research Fellow at Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2007“The Tragedy of Darfur and the Limits of ‘The Responsibility to Protect’” Global Review of Ethnopolitics http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content?content=10.1080/17449050600911745June 2007 In Search of Alternatives]

The rhetoric about a diffuse responsibility to protect, combined with continuing disagreement about what such a responsibility entails and a lack of will about its enforcement, has failed to save lives, to secure human dignity or to provide the necessary stability to achieve and implement a comprehensive political settlement in Darfur. This failure demonstrates a major paradox in the responsibility to protect approach. On the one hand, the growth of the human rights discourse in Western societies has made it increasingly difficult to ignore crises around the globe, even where such crises do not directly affect Western interests. Occasionally, as in Kosovo, Western states are able to muster enough political will to intervene militarily on humanitarian grounds. On the other hand, as the case of Darfur confirms, the human rights rhetoric has a profound impact on how marginalized groups evaluate their options. International interest can provide these groups with an incentive for radicalization. At the same time, Western governments are generally reluctant to intervene militarily in those cases that do not implicate national interests, as traditionally conceived. Ultimately, weak implementation of human rights norms neither prevents nor ends the abuses carried about by a rights-violating government such as the one in Khartoum.

#### The status quo is structurally improving

Dash 2/4 Co-Founder and Managing Director at Activate, a new kind of strategy consultancy that advises companies about the opportunities at the intersection of technology and media co-founder and CEO of ThinkUp, which shows you how to be better at using your social networks, publisher, editor and owner of Dashes.com, my personal blog where I've been publishing continuously since 1999, entrepreneur, writer and geek living in New York City (Anil Dash, 4 February 2013, “THE WORLD IS GETTING BETTER. QUICKLY.,” http://dashes.com/anil/2013/02/the-world-is-getting-better-quickly.html)

The world is getting better, faster, than we could ever have imagined. For those of us who are fortunate enough to live in wealthy communities or countries, we have a common set of reference points we use to describe the world's most intractable, upsetting, unimaginable injustices. Often, we only mention these horrible realities in minimizing our own woes: "Well, that's annoying, but it's hardly as bad as children starving in Africa." Or "Yeah, this is important, but it's not like it's the cure for AIDS." Or the omnipresent description of any issue as a "First World Problem". But let's, for once, look at the actual data around developing world problems. Not our condescending, world-away displays of emotion, or our slacktivist tendencies to see a retweet as meaningful action, but the actual numbers and metrics about how progress is happening for the world's poorest people. Though metrics and measurements are always fraught and flawed, Gates' single biggest emphasis was the idea that measurable progress and metrics are necessary for any meaningful improvements to happen in the lives of the world's poor. So how are we doing? THE WORLD HAS CHANGED The results are astounding. Even if we caveat that every measurement is imprecise, that billionaire philanthropists are going to favor data that strengthens their points, and that some of the most significant problems are difficult to attach metrics to, it's inarguable that the past two decades have seen the greatest leap forward in the lives of the global poor in the history of humanity. Some highlights: Children are 1/3 less likely to die before age five than they were in 1990. The global childhood mortality rate for kids under 5 has dropped from 88 in 1000 in 1990 to 57 in 1000 in 2010. The global infant mortality rate for kids dying before age one has plunged from 61 in 1000 to 40 in 1000. Now, any child dying is of course one child too many, but this is astounding progress to have made in just twenty years. In the past 30 years, the percentage of children who receive key immunizations such as the DTP vaccine has quadrupled. The percentage of people in the world living on less than $1.25 per day has been cut in half since 1990, ahead of the schedule of the Millennium Development Goals which hoped to reach this target by 2015. The number of deaths to tuberculosis has been cut 40% in the past twenty years. The consumption of ozone-depleting substances has been cut 85% globally in the last thirty years. The percentage of urban dwellers living in slums globally has been cut from 46.2% to 32.7% in the last twenty years. And there's more progress in hunger and contraception, in sustainability and education, against AIDS and illiteracy. After reading the Gates annual letter and following up by reviewing the UN's ugly-but-data-rich Millennium Development Goals statistics site, I was surprised by how much progress has been made in the years since I've been an adult, and just how little I've heard about the big picture despite the fact that I'd like to keep informed about such things. I'm not a pollyanna — there's a lot of work to be done. But I can personally attest to the profound effect that basic improvements like clean drinking water can have in people's lives. Today, we often use the world's biggest problems as metaphors for impossibility. But the evidence shows that, actually, we're really good at solving even the most intimidating challenges in the world. What we're lacking is the ability to communicate effectively about how we make progress, so that we can galvanize even more investment of resources, time and effort to tackling the problems we have left.

### Hospitality

#### No solvency—sanctions against Iran are inevitable

#### Selecting only Cuba to focus their ethics on necessarily requires hatred of the faceless thirds left to die as a result – universal indifference is the only ethical stance

Zizek, 2005 [http://www.lacan.com/zizsmash.htm]

One should therefore assume the risk of countering Levinas's position with a more radical one: others are primordially an (ethically) indifferent multitude, and love is a violent gesture of cutting into this multitude and privileging a One as the neighbor, thus introducing a radical imbalance into the whole. In contrast to love, justice begins when I remember the faceless many left in shadow in this privileging of the One. Justice and love are thus structurally incompatible: justice, not love, has to be blind, it has to disregard the privileged One whom I “really understand." What this means is that the Third is not secondary: it is always-already here, and the primordial ethical obligation is towards this Third who is NOT here in the face to face relationship, the one in shadow, like the absent child of a love-couple. This not simply the Derridean-Kierkegaardian point that I always betray the Other because toute autre est un autre, because I have to make a CHOICE to SELECT who my neighbor is from the mass of the Thirds, and this is the original sin-choice of love. The structure is similar to the one described by Emile Benveniste apropos verbs: the primordial couple is not active-passive, to which the neutral form is then added, but active and neutral (along the axis of engaged-disengaged). The primordial couple is Neutral and Evil (the choice which disturbs the neutral balance), or, grammatically, impersonal Other and me - "you" is a secondary addition. [4](http://www.lacan.com/zizsmash.htm" \l "4x) In order to properly grasp the triangle of love, hatred and indifference, one has to rely on the logic of the universal and its constitutive exception which only introduces existence. The truth of the universal proposition "Man is mortal" does not imply the existence of even one man, while the "less strong" proposition "There is at least one man who exists (i.e., some men exist)" implies their existence. Lacan draws from this the conclusion that we pass from universal proposition (which defines the content of a notion) to existence only through a proposition stating the existence of - not the at least one element of the universal genus which exists, but - at least one which is an exception to the universality in question. What this means with regard to love is that the universal proposition "I love you all" acquires the level of actual existence only if "there is at least one whom I hate" - the thesis abundantly confirmed by the fact that universal love for humanity always led to the brutal hatred of the (actually existing) exception, of the enemies of humanity. This hatred of the exception is the "truth" of universal love, in contrast to true love which can only emerge aganst the background - NOT of universal hatred, but - of universal indifference: I am indifferent towards All, the totality of the universe, and as such, I actually love YOU, the unique individual who stands/sticks out of this indifferent background. Love and hatred are thus not symmetrical: love emerges out of the universal indifference, while hatred emerges out of universal love. In short, we are dealing here again with the formulas of sexuation: "I do not love you all" is the only foundation of "there is nobody that I do not love," while "I love you all" necessarily relies on "I really hate some of you." "But I love you all," defended himself Erich Mielke, the Secret Police boss of the DDR - his universal love was obviously grounded in its constitutive exception, the hatred of the enemies of socialism. This brings us to the radical anti-Levinasian conclusion: the true ethical step is the one BEYOND the face of the other, the one of SUSPENDING the hold of the face: the choice AGAINST the face, for the THIRD. This coldness IS justice at its most elementary. Every preempting of the Other in the guise of his face relegates the Third to the faceless background. And the elementary gesture of justice is not to show respect for the face in front of me, to be open for its depth, but to abstract from it and refocus onto the faceless Thirds in the background. It is only such a shift of focus onto the Third that effectively uproots justice, liberating it from the contingent umbilical link that renders her »embedded« in a particular situation.In other words, it is only such a shift onto the Third that grounds justice in the dimension of universality proper. When Levinas endeavors to ground ethics in the Other's face, is he not still clinging to the ultimate root of the ethical commitment, afraid to accept the abyss of the rootless Law as the only foundation of ethics? Justice as blind thus means that, precisely, it cannot be grounded in the relationship to the Other's face, i.e., in the relationship to the neighbor: justice is emphatically NOT justice for - with regard to - the neighbor.

#### Working through political institutions BANKRUPTS their movement – it relegates ethics to the margins and replaces it with immoral power-mongering

Gauthier 7 (David, 1 Department of Political Science, Illinois Wesleyan University, “Levinas and the Politics of Hospitality,” HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. Vol. XXVIII. No. 1. Spring 2007)

It is not difficult to anticipate the core features of a Levinasian politics. Obviously, the state and its accompanying institutions should respect irreducible human dignity and rest on an ethical foundation. Politically, the self is called to welcome the Third into its public space by creating a political community where individual human dignity is respected and ethical conduct encouraged. However, extending such a welcome turns out to be a highly problematic endeavour because the sphere where political action occurs is radically dissimilar from the an-archical realm where the hospitable gesture is privately performed.

The non-ethical aspect of the political realm is epitomized in what Levinas calls the ‘State of Caesar’. Levinas’s discussion of the State of Caesar occurs in the context of an essay entitled ‘The State of Caesar and the State of David’. Like the other writings gathered in *Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures*, Levinas’s essay is presented in the form of a reading of the Talmud. From Levinas’s perspective, the significance of the Torah lies in the fact that it ‘demands in opposition to the natural perseverance of each being for his or her own being (a fundamental ontological law), care for the stranger, widow, and the orphan, a preoccupation with the other person’.38 The Torah thus possesses an ethical significance that elevates it beyond the purview of ontological thought. In his ‘State of Caesar’ piece, Levinas presents a reading of the Talmud that highlights how Christian political theory contravenes the ethical thrust of the Torah.39

In the essay, Levinas utilizes the locution ‘state of Caesar’ to designate the non-ethical, autonomous practice of politics. No mere reference to the Roman *res publica*, then, the term potentially encompasses everything from the Greek *polis* to themodern nation-state. Even if its existence precedes the birth of Christianity, however, the definitive feature of the state of Caesar is its conformity to the Christian imperative to ‘Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s’. In other words, the Caesarian state is the political entity that complements the Augustinian dichotomy between the temporal and the spiritual that, in Levinas’s view, epitomizes the Christian conception of politics.

The Christian approach to politics is, for Levinas, inherently problematic in that its demarcation between the earthly city of man and the city of God leaves the former ethically unregulated. The Augustinian distinction between the city of man and the *Civitas Dei* is problematic not because it introduces a tension between the political and the spiritual but because it *precludes* the possibility of such tension: ‘In Christianity, the kingdom of God and the earthly kingdom are separated yet placed side by side without touching and, in principle, without contesting each other.’40 While this arrangement facilitates the harmonious co-existence of political power and its spiritual competitor, the fact that Christianity has often been a state religion reveals that one of its chief beneficiaries is the state itself. By promoting Christianity with the seal of official approval, the state in turn receives a blank check to conduct itself in whatever fashion it fancies. Liberated by Christianity’s political indifference, the state is left free to succumb to Machiavellian power-aggrandizement.

As it has developed under the influence of centuries of spiritually-sanctioned ethical neglect, the political realm is a place that is inhospitable to moral action: ‘politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naiveté’.41 As ‘the art of foreseeing war and of winning it by any means’, the practice of the political art (*techn\_*) is inspired by an overriding desire to get the better of one’s fellows. Indeed, even the actions of the most peace-minded political actors are driven by the desire to dominate adversaries and ascend to a position of power and influence on the political hierarchy. In the fact that it is inherently warlike, the practice of the political art is revealed to be not only amoral but downright immoral.

The political art is also impersonal; politics is inextricably connected with the art of lawgiving, with the formulation and execution of abstract laws. By virtue of their general quality, laws make no allowance for the fact of human alterity, an alterity exemplified in the form of the unlucky exception whose very existence confounds the broad brush of generalization that animates the lawgiving art. Even in their most enlightened form, laws oppress the individual. The universalizing spirit that inspires the legislation and execution of laws mark the political realm as inherently tyrannical. As Levinas writes, ‘politics left to itself bears a tyranny within itself; it deforms the I and Other who have given rise to it, for it judges them according to universal rules, and thus in absentia (sic)’.42

For Levinas, the impersonal, and hence tyrannical, nature of political life is reflected in the manner in which it prizes state-works over the men who constitute them.Whether it is the ancient city-state or themodern nation-state, the state-work totalizes the individual: ‘In political life, taken unrebuked, humanity is understood from its works — a humanity of interchangeable men, or reciprocal relations.’43 In such a milieu, exploitation is inevitable. The first casualties of the war are

the political actors themselves, all of whom must submerge their identity into the state totality.

Much as the political sphere is organically incapable of fostering respect for human dignity, it is equally hostile to a monotheistic orientation. Indeed, the state of Caesar more closely resembles a pagan idol. Unlike other pagan gods, however, the state-god reveals itself to be a particularly jealous deity. Ever mindful of challenges to its sovereignty, the ‘pagan State’ will brutally suppress all internal and external threats: The State of Caesar separates humanity from its deliverance by developing without hindrance and reaching the plenitude (or hypertrophy—natural, as it were) of the form it received from the Graeco-Roman world, the pagan State, jealous of its sovereignty, the State in search of hegemony, the conquering, imperialist, totalitarian, oppressive State, attached to realist egoism. 44 In the context of a critique of Augustinian politics, it is ironic that Levinas’s description of the state of Caesar recalls Augustine’s critique of the City of Man. Apparently, Levinas would thus concur with Augustine’s notion that ‘kingdoms’ are little more than ‘gangs of criminals on a large scale’.45 Levinas shares Augustine’s dark view of the political. Like Augustine, Levinas bemoans the moral corruption that characterizes the institutional manifestations of the political. Yet, Levinas insists that the face of the Third calls for the creation of political and juridical institutions that reflect the respect for individual personhood that befits the children of God. What the Caesarian state delivers instead is war and individual self-alienation, relegating ethics to the margins of political life.

#### Their moral decision-making is apathetic and evil

Issac, 02—Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest)

Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intentions does not ensure the achievement of what one intends**.** Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally comprised parties may seem like the right thing, but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness, it is often a form of complicity in injustice**.** This is why, from the standpoint of politics-as opposed to religion-pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits thisjudgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Life is always valuable

**Torchia, Providence philosophy professor, 2002**

(Joseph, “Postmodernism and the Persistent Vegetative State,” The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly Summer 2002, Vol. 2, No. 2, <http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/torc/torc_01postmodernismandpvs1.html>)

Ultimately, Aquinas' theory of personhood requires a metaphysical explanation that is rooted in an understanding of the primacy of the existence or esse of the human person. For humans beings, the upshot of this position is clear: while human personhood is intimately connected with a broad range of actions (including consciousness of oneself and others), the definition of personhood is not based upon any specific activity or capacity for action, but upon the primacy of esse. Indeed, human actions would have neither a cause nor any referent in the absence of a stable, abiding self that is rooted in the person's very being. A commitment to the primacy of esse, then, allows for an adequate recognition of the importance of actions in human life, while providing a principle for the unification and stabilizing of these behavioral features. In this respect, the human person is defined as a dynamic being which actualizes the potentiality for certain behavior or operations unique to his or her own existence. Esse thereby embraces all that the person is and is capable of doing. In the final analysis, **any attempt to define the person in terms of a single attribute, activity, or capability** (e.g., consciousness) flies in the face of the depth and multi-dimensionality which is part and parcel of personhood itself. To do so **would abdicate the ontological core of the person and the very center which renders human activities intelligible**. And Aquinas' anthropology, I submit, provides an effective philosophical lens through which the depth and profundity of the human reality comes into sharp focus. In this respect, Kenneth Schmitz draws an illuminating distinction between "person" (a term which conveys such hidden depth and profundity) and "personality" (a term which pertains to surface impressions and one's public image).40 The preoccupation with the latter term, he shows, is very much an outgrowth of the eighteenth century emphasis upon a human individuality that is understood in terms of autonomy and privacy. This notion of the isolated, atomistic individual was closely linked with a subjective focus whereby the "self" became the ultimate referent for judging reality. By extension, such a presupposition led to the conviction that only self-consciousness provides a means of validating any claims to personhood and membership in a community of free moral agents capable of responsibilities and worthy of rights. In contrast to such an isolated and enclosed conception (i.e., whereby one is a person by virtue of being "set apart" from others as a privatized entity), Schmitz focuses upon an intimacy which presupposes a certain relation between persons. From this standpoint, intimacy is only possible through genuine self-disclosure, and the sharing of self-disclosure that allows for an intimate knowledge of the other.41 For Schmitz, such a revelation of one's inner self transcends any specific attributes or any overt capacity the individual might possess.42 Ultimately, Schmitz argues, intimacy is rooted in the unique act of presencing, whereby the person reveals his or her personal existence. But such a mystery only admits of a metphysical explanation, rather than an epistemological theory of meaning which confines itself to what is observable on the basis of perception or sense experience. Intimacy, then, discloses a level of being that transcends any distinctive properties. Because intimacy has a unique capacity to disclose being, it places us in touch with the very core of personhood. Metaphysically speaking, intimacy is not grounded in the recognition of this or that characteristic a person has, but rather in the simple unqualified presence the person is.43

#### **Utilitarian reasoning is inevitable**

**Ratner, ‘84**

[Leonard G. Ratner, Legion Lex Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center, “ARTICLE: THE UTILITARIAN IMPERATIVE: AUTONOMY, RECIPROCITY, AND EVOLUTION.,” 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 723, \*, Spring 1984]

All systems of morality, however transcendental, rest ultimately on utilitarian self interest (i.e., on personal need/want fulfillment), because those who fashion such systems, like those who accept or reject them, cannot escape their own humanness. The physically controllable acts of each individual [221](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=89696d9cf0df08452ef1deec45cb749e&docnum=7&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAz&_md5=fa0a274ba9ba3cbd4e0456a37aac271e&focBudTerms=ratner&focBudSel=all#n221) are the choice of that individual, though all of the consequences may not be foreseen or desired. [222](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=89696d9cf0df08452ef1deec45cb749e&docnum=7&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAz&_md5=fa0a274ba9ba3cbd4e0456a37aac271e&focBudTerms=ratner&focBudSel=all#n222) Behavior choices are necessarily determined by the experience, feelings, habits, and attitudes; the concerns and beliefs; the needs and wants -- in short, by the ultimate self interest -- of the individual.

### Framing

#### Cross apply Boulding

#### Magnitude always outweighs

Bostrom, Oxford philosophy professor, July 5

[Nick, Transcribed by Matt Struth, 4:38-6:12 of the talk at http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/view/id/44, accessed 2-2-8]

Now if we think about what just reducing the probability of human extinction by just one percentage point, not very much, that’s equivalent to 60 million lives saved, if we just count the current living people, one percent of 6 billion equivalent to 60 million. So that's a large number. If we were to account for future generations that would never come into existence if we were to blow ourselves up, the figure becomes astronomical. If we could eventually colonize a chunk of the universe, the Vergo supercluster, maybe it will take us a hundred million years to get there, but if we go extinct we never will - then even a one percentage point reduction could be equivalent to this astronomical number 10^32. So if you take into account future generations as much as our own, every other moral imperative just becomes irrelevant. The only thing you should focus on should be existential risk. Because even the tiniest decrease in existential risk would just overwhelm every other benefit you could hope to achieve.

#### Callahan concedes that genuine threats to survival cause tyranny

Callahan, Director of International Program, PhD on philosophy in Harvard, 1985

(Daniel, The Tyranny of Survival and Other Pathologies of Civilized Life, p. 91-93 Kim)

The first requirement is that a way be found to respond to the need for survival without, at the same time, allowing that need to become a tyranny. **The tyranny can result either because of a panic in the face of a genuine threat to survival, because survival is invoked for self-interested or totalitarian political purposes or because of an unnecessarily or unrealistically high standard of acceptable survival.** Perhaps it is possible to do no more in the face of the last two possibilities than to be aware of their potential force, and by political and cultural debate to neutralize or overcome their baneful effect. The panic which can result from a real threat to survival will be more difficult to coue with. a uanic which can lead to draconian measures in the , . name of self-preservation. At that point, the question must be faced whether there can be such a thing as too high a price to pay for survival. I believe there can be, particularly when the proposed price would involve the wholesale killing of the weak and innocent, the sacrifice to an extreme degree of the values and traditions which give people their sense of meaning and identity, and the bequeath- ing to f h r e generations of a condition of life which would be degrading and dehumanizing. The price would be too high when the evil of the means chosen would be such as to create an intolerable life both for the winners and for the losers. While it might be possible to conceive of individuals willing to have their lives sacrificed for the sake of group survival, it becomes more difficult to imagine whoIe groups being willing to make such a sacrifice. And there is a very serious moral question whether that kind of sacrifice should ever be asked for or accepted, even on a voluntary basis.

#### Nuclear war causes extinction – here’s the most qualified, recent evidence

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[Steven, “The climatic consequences of nuclear war”, March 12, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-climatic-consequences-of-nuclear-war]

This isn't a question to be avoided. Recent scientific studies PDF have found that a war fought with the deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals would leave Earth virtually uninhabitable. In fact, NASA computer models have shown that even a "successful" first strike by Washington or Moscow would inflict catastrophic environmental damage that would make agriculture impossible and cause mass starvation. Similarly, in the January Scientific American, Alan Robock and Brian Toon, the foremost experts on the climatic impact of nuclear war, warn that the environmental consequences of a "regional" nuclear war would cause a global famine that could kill one billion people. Their article, "Local Nuclear War: Global Suffering," PDF predicts that the detonation of 100 15-kiloton nuclear weapons in Indian and Pakistani megacities would create urban firestorms that would loft 5 million tons of thick, black smoke above cloud level. (This smoke would engulf the entire planet within 10 days.) Because the smoke couldn't be rained out, it would remain in the stratosphere for at least a decade and have profoundly disruptive effects. Specifically, the smoke layer would block sunlight, heat the upper atmosphere, and cause massive destruction of protective stratospheric ozone. A 2008 study PDF calculated ozone losses (after the described conflict) of 25-45 percent above mid-latitudes and 50-70 percent above northern high latitudes persisting for five years, with substantial losses continuing for another five years. Such severe ozone depletion would allow intense levels of harmful ultraviolet light to reach Earth's surface--even with the stratospheric smoke layer in place. Beneath the smoke, the loss of warming sunlight would produce average surface temperatures colder than any experienced in the last 1,000 years. There would be a corresponding shortening of growing seasons by up to 30 days and significant reductions in average rainfall in many areas, with a 40-percent decrease of precipitation in the Asian monsoon region. Basically, the Earth's surface would become cold, dark, and dry. Humans have had some experience with this sort of deadly global climate change. In 1815, the largest volcanic eruption in recorded history took place in Indonesia. Mount Tambora exploded and created a stratospheric layer of sulfuric acid droplets that blocked sunlight from reaching Earth. During the following year, which was known as "The Year without Summer," the northeastern United States experienced snowstorms in June and debilitating frosts every month of the year. In an earlier study PDF, Robock, Toon, and their colleagues predicted that the decreases in average surface temperatures following the nuclear conflict described above would be 2-3 times colder than those experienced in 1816 and that the black soot produced by subsequent nuclear firestorms would remain in the stratosphere five times longer than the acid clouds from volcanic eruptions. In other words, 10 years after a regional nuclear war, Earth's average surface temperatures would still be as cold, or colder, than they were in 1816. Most likely, the long-lived smoke layer would produce a "decade without a summer." Here it's important to point out that the 100 Hiroshima-size weapons detonated in Robock and Toon's regional war scenario contain less than 1 percent of the combined explosive power in the 7,000 or so operational and deployed nuclear weapons the United States and Russia possess. If even one-half of these weapons were detonated in urban areas, Robock and Toon have predicted that the resulting nuclear darkness would cause daily minimum temperatures to fall below freezing in the largest agricultural areas of the Northern Hemisphere for a period of between one to three years. Meanwhile, average global surface temperatures would become colder than those experienced 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age. Amazingly, however, no follow-up studies have been initiated to further evaluate the decreases in temperature, precipitation, or ozone depletion predicted to arise from either regional or strategic nuclear war. Large studies were conducted in the 1980s on "nuclear winter" by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the World Meteorological Organization, and the International Council for Science's Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment. But given that Robock and Toon's new research has found that these early studies significantly underestimated the climatic and environmental consequences of nuclear war, wouldn't it make sense for such groups to now revisit the subject? At the very least, Washington and Moscow, with 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, should be required to investigate the environmental and climatic consequences from a nuclear war created by their nuclear arsenals. Moreover, in the United States, there appears to be a legal basis to force the Defense Department to evaluate the likely consequences of its nuclear arsenal. According to the EPA's website, "The National Environmental Policy Act [NEPA] requires federal agencies to integrate environmental values into their decision-making processes by considering the environmental impacts of their proposed actions and reasonable alternatives to those actions. To meet NEPA requirements, federal agencies [must] prepare a detailed statement known as an Environmental Impact Statement." If that's the case, why not require Defense to create an Environmental Impact Statement for the more than 1,000 U.S. strategic nuclear weapons now on high-alert? To date, the discussion of a nuclear-weapons-free world has included no mention of the environmental consequences of nuclear war. I fear that without such a dialogue, the debate lacks the sense of urgency required to change the nuclear status quo. That's why I believe that a wake-up call from the scientific community is seriously needed. Regardless of how "safe from use" U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons are considered to be, they still could wipe out humanity. Thus, the recognition by Washington that its nuclear arsenal, if used in conflict, will make the whole world--including all of its territory--uninhabitable, is long overdue.